Reasons for willing John Duns Scotus' critical assessment of Aristotle's notion of rational and non-rational powers

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dc.contributorHofmeister Pich, Roberto
dc.contributorStorck, Alfredo Carlos
dc.contributorCulleton, Alfredo Santiago
dc.creatorElías, Gloria Silvana
dc.date2021
dc.date.accessioned2026-03-10T03:30:44Z
dc.date.available2026-03-10T03:30:44Z
dc.descriptionIn his Quaestiones super libros Methaphysicorum Aristotelis IX q.151, John Duns Scotus examines the difference between rational and non-rational potencies, proposed by Aristotle in Metaphysics IX 2. According to Aristotle, rational potencies are capable of producing opposite effects, while non-rational ones operate ad unum, i.e. directed to achieve one of the opposite effects. We propose that Scotus' intention was to determine the principle that makes the rationality or non-rationality of a potency, in order to find the foundation of actual contingency. In fact, rationality as a distinguishing attribute of potencies, and the subsequent affirmation of the intrinsic rationality of the will, allow Scotus to assert that actual contingency is a rational mode of organization of the real. The purpose of this paper is -based on an interpretation of the well-known Scotistic distinction between natural and free active principles- to show the place that Scotus ultimately gives to human action, whose foundation is the only rational potency in strict sense: the will. It is precisely in the analysis of this potency that we find the Scotistic thesis of synchronic contingency of the present, which opens a new perspective on the issue of human freedom and action.
dc.descriptionFil: Elías, Gloria Silvana. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Salta. Unidad Ejecutora en Ciencias Sociales Regionales y Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Jujuy. Unidad Ejecutora en Ciencias Sociales Regionales y Humanidades; Argentina
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dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/227931
dc.identifierElías, Gloria Silvana; Reasons for willing John Duns Scotus' critical assessment of Aristotle's notion of rational and non-rational powers; Brepols Publishers; 2021; 1-16
dc.identifier9782503592640
dc.identifierCONICET Digital
dc.identifierCONICET
dc.identifier.urihttps://ri.unju.edu.ar/handle/123456789/546
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherBrepols Publishers
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.brepols.net/Pages/ShowProduct.aspx?prod_id=IS-9782503592633-1
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subjectSCOTUS
dc.subjectWILLING
dc.subjectWILL
dc.subjectRATIONALITY
dc.subjecthttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
dc.subjecthttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.titleReasons for willing John Duns Scotus' critical assessment of Aristotle's notion of rational and non-rational powers
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/parte de libro
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