Hofmeister Pich, RobertoStorck, Alfredo CarlosCulleton, Alfredo Santiago2026-03-102026-03-10https://ri.unju.edu.ar/handle/123456789/546In his Quaestiones super libros Methaphysicorum Aristotelis IX q.151, John Duns Scotus examines the difference between rational and non-rational potencies, proposed by Aristotle in Metaphysics IX 2. According to Aristotle, rational potencies are capable of producing opposite effects, while non-rational ones operate ad unum, i.e. directed to achieve one of the opposite effects. We propose that Scotus' intention was to determine the principle that makes the rationality or non-rationality of a potency, in order to find the foundation of actual contingency. In fact, rationality as a distinguishing attribute of potencies, and the subsequent affirmation of the intrinsic rationality of the will, allow Scotus to assert that actual contingency is a rational mode of organization of the real. The purpose of this paper is -based on an interpretation of the well-known Scotistic distinction between natural and free active principles- to show the place that Scotus ultimately gives to human action, whose foundation is the only rational potency in strict sense: the will. It is precisely in the analysis of this potency that we find the Scotistic thesis of synchronic contingency of the present, which opens a new perspective on the issue of human freedom and action.Fil: Elías, Gloria Silvana. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Salta. Unidad Ejecutora en Ciencias Sociales Regionales y Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Jujuy. Unidad Ejecutora en Ciencias Sociales Regionales y Humanidades; Argentinaapplication/pdfapplication/zipapplication/pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/SCOTUSWILLINGWILLRATIONALITYhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion